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Abstract 
Individuals often allow prior investments of time, money or effort to influence their current behavior. A tendency 
to allow previous investments to impact further investment, referred to as the sunk-cost fallacy, may be related to 
adverse psychological health. Unfortunately, little is known about the relation between the sunk-cost fallacy and psy-
chological symptoms or help seeking. The current study used a relatively novel approach (i.e., Amazon.com’s Mechani-
cal Turk crowdsourcing [AMT] service) to examine various aspects of psychological health in internet users (n = 1053) 
that did and did not commit the sunk-cost fallacy. In this observational study, individuals logged on to AMT, selected 
the “decision making survey” amongst the array of currently available tasks, and completed the approximately 
200-question survey (which included a two-trial sunk cost task, the brief symptom inventory 18, the Binge Eating 
Scale, portions of the SF-8 health survey, and other questions about treatment utilization). Individuals that committed 
the fallacy reported a greater number of symptoms related to Binge Eating Disorder and Depression, being bothered 
more by emotional problems, yet waited longer to seek assistance when feeling ill. The current findings are discussed 
in relation to promoting help-seeking behavior amongst individuals that commit this logical fallacy.
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Background
Each day we make many decisions that impact our men-
tal and physical health. For instance, we may choose 
whether or not to exercise, smoke cigarettes, or have that 
decadent desert. Each of these decisions is undoubtedly 
influenced by numerous variables, both immediate and 
temporally distant. Understanding these influences may 
help us facilitate healthy decisions across a wide range of 
populations.
The sunk-cost fallacy (effect) is one way that tempo-
rally distant events may influence current behavior (e.g., 
medical compliance; Christensen-Szalanski and North-
craft 1985). “The sunk cost effect is a maladaptive eco-
nomic behavior that is manifested in a greater tendency 
to continue an endeavor once an investment in money, 
effort, or time has been made” (Arkes and Ayton 1999). 
The sunk-cost fallacy has been linked to psychological 
processes such as risk aversion (Northcraft and Neale 
1986) foraging (Pavic and Passino 2011), and a desire to 
not appear wasteful (Arkes and Blumer 1985). Research 
on the sunk-cost fallacy, however, provides little guidance 
regarding which populations are most likely to commit 
the sunk-cost fallacy, and the relation between commit-
ting the sunk-cost fallacy and psychological health.
A few studies, however, have focused on identifying 
populations that do and do not commit the sunk-cost 
fallacy. For example, Strough et  al. (2008) had younger 
adults (18–27  years old; n =  75) and older adults (58–
71  years old; n  =  73) read a series of vignettes about 
watching a boring movie. One pair of vignettes manipu-
lated the cost of watching the movie (i.e., $10.95 or free), 
and the other pair of vignettes manipulated the time 
invested in watching the movie. Because the money/
time spent on the movie cannot be recouped, watching 
the movie for longer after having paid for it, relative to 
when it is free, is an example of committing the sunk-
cost fallacy. When asked how much longer they would 
continue to watch the movie, younger adults were more 
likely to commit the sunk-cost fallacy than older adults, 
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particularly when the previous investment entailed 
money (also see Bruine de Bruin et al. 2007; Strough et al. 
2011).
An individuals’ propensity or commit the sunk-cost 
fallacy may be elevated in certain clinical populations. 
First, rumination, a characteristic of depression (Nolen-
Hoeksema 1991), entails an undue influence of past 
events over present behavior. Further, meditation, which 
is effective supplemental treatment for depression, has 
been shown to reduce the sunk cost fallacy (Hafenbrack 
et  al. 2014). We therefore hypothesize that depressive 
symptoms may be positively related to ones’ propensity 
to commit the sunk cost fallacy. Specifically, because the 
sunk-cost fallacy involves previous investments (i.e., past 
events) irrationally influencing further investment (i.e., 
present behavior), individuals that commit the sunk-cost 
fallacy may also display more symptoms of depression. 
Second, the sunk-cost fallacy may provide helpful clues as 
to the underlying mechanism of overeating. In a study by 
Siniver, Mealem, and Yaniv (2013), for example, individu-
als who were forced to pay prior to getting access to an-
all you can buffet ate significantly more than those who 
were forced to pay after the meal. Further, individuals 
with a higher BMI may also be more likely to commit the 
sunk-cost fallacy in a trial-based analog task (Sofis et al. 
2015). By extension, we hypothesize that symptoms asso-
ciated Binge Eating Disorder, which is often co-morbid 
with depression symptomology (e.g., Schulz and Laessle 
2010), may also be associated with a higher propensity to 
commit the sunk-cost fallacy. Specifically, we hypothesize 
that in binge eating disorder, the tendency to continue 
eating (i.e., to further consume/invest) may be in part a 
function of how much has recently been consumed (i.e., 
initial investment). The current investigation examines 
the potential relation between symptoms of binge eating 
disorder and the sunk-cost fallacy.
Although few studies have linked the sunk-cost fallacy 
to help seeking, one study did link committing the sunk-
cost fallacy to treatment decisions. Specifically, Coleman 
(2010) presented scenarios wherein subjects indicated 
if they would spend time attending a free treatment for 
their back pain (i.e., massage) or would go to sessions of 
an inferior treatment (i.e., chiropractor) in which they 
had already invested money, time, or effort. The amount 
of the previous investment varied across groups. Spe-
cifically, participants either invested less than market 
value, market value, or more than market value. Larger 
investments of money or effort were associated with an 
increased tendency to use the inferior treatment, whereas 
investments of time had little impact.
The current study sought to fill these gaps in our 
understanding of the relation between the sunk-cost fal-
lacy and both psychological symptomology and help 
seeking. Specifically, in addition to replicating previous 
relations (i.e., age and the sunk cost fallacy, treatment 
utilization and the sunk-cost fallacy), the present study 
investigated the relation between committing the sunk-
cost fallacy and symptoms of BED, depression sympto-
mology, and various self-reported help seeking behaviors. 
A novel but readily available technology (i.e., Amazon.
com’s Mechanical Turk [AMT] crowdsourcing service) 




The current study was presented to participants as a 
Human Intelligence Task (HIT) using AMT. AMT users 
could access the survey only if they were from the United 
States and if requesters had previously accepted at least 
90 percent of their HITs. 1190 individuals meeting these 
criteria completed the survey. To ensure careful com-
pletion of the survey, HITs were not accepted if AMT 
users indicated that they failed to understand the task 
instructions, completed fewer than 80  % of the survey 
items, completed the survey in less than 800 s (where the 
mean completion time was 1472  s), or had non-varying 
patterns of responding on the survey’s delay discount-
ing task (a pattern indicative of inattentive responding; 
delay discounting data not reported). Analyses presented 
from the current study are from 1053 participating AMT 
users with data that passed these screening criteria. Of 
those participants, 54 % were female, the average age was 
31.76  years old (SD  =  11.53), the group was generally 
well educated (2 % had less than a high school diploma, 
10 % had a high school diploma, 35 % had attended some 
college, 8 % had Associates degrees, 31 % had Bachelors 
degrees, and 14 % had advanced degrees) and the median 
income was $23,750 (IQR = $7000, $48,750). See Table 1 
for demographic information broken down by group. 
Materials
The data represent a subset of answers to questions in an 
approximately 200-question survey about health, social 
behaviors and decision-making. This survey included 
questions indicative of committing the sunk-cost fallacy, 
demographic information (e.g., age, gender, income, edu-
cation, and smoking status), the Brief Symptom Inven-
tory-18 (BSI-18), the Binge Eating Scale (BES), a measure 
on treatment utilization, and a measure of the partici-
pant’s perceived physical and mental health.
The sunk cost fallacy
Participants read a pair of vignettes almost identical to 
those used by Strough et  al. (2008). Vignettes are the 
most common method used to evaluate the sunk cost 
Page 3 of 7Jarmolowicz et al. SpringerPlus  (2016) 5:1699 
effect (Arkes and Blumer 1985; Staw 1976). Typically, par-
ticipants are told about a hypothetical scenario wherein 
they previously invested in a service or commodity which 
sets up a choice or decision scenario that is the depend-
ent variable of interest. In the current study participants 
were asked, based on the context provided by the initial 
scenario, whether or not they will make an investment 
of time and how much of that investment they will make 
[for a review of the various forms of sunk cost, see Roth 
et al. (2014)]. In the current study, each participant expe-
rienced two initial hypothetical scenarios wherein the 
only difference is that in one of them you have paid for 
the activity and in the other scenario you did not. Spe-
cifically, the first of these two vignette options entailed 
paying to watch the movie (i.e., “You paid $10.95 to see 
a movie on pay TV. After 5 min, you are bored and the 
movie seems pretty bad”), whereas the second vignette 
entailed watching the movie for free (i.e., “You are watch-
ing a movie on TV. After 5 min, you are bored and the 
movie seems pretty bad”). After reading each vignette, 
the participants indicated how much longer they would 
watch the movie (i.e., stop watching entirely, watch for 
10 more minutes, watch for 20 more minutes, watch for 
30 more minutes, or watch until the end). A participant 
would demonstrate the sunk-cost fallacy by indicating 
that they would be willing to watch the movie longer 
after being told that they had already paid for it.
Brief Symptom Inventory‑18 (BSI‑18)
Participants answered 18 questions that assess their lev-
els of somatization, depression, and anxiety symptoms 
(Derogatis 2001). These questions asked how much a 
particular symptom has bothered them over the previous 
7 days. Symptoms indicative of each of the three domains 
were intermixed, and all responses were made on a 0 (not 
at all) to 4 (extremely) likert-type scale.
Binge Eating Scale (BES)
Participants indicated which statement out of a group 
of 3–4 statements best describes their eating patterns. 
For instance, one group included the following num-
bered statements: “I don’t feel any guilt or self-hate when 
I overeat”; “After I overeat, I occasionally feel guilt or 
self-hate”; “Almost all the time I experience strong guilt 
or self-hate when I overeat.” This process was repeated 
across 16 groups of statements, and the score across 
all 16 groups were weighted (see Gormally et  al. 1982, 
for details) and summed to indicate participants’ BES 
Table 1 Data from individuals that did and did not commit the sunk-cost fallacy







 Somatization 4.85 (4.93) 5.91 (5.06) 0.202
 Depression 2.66 (2.64) 2.94 (2.94) 0.006 0.209
 Anxiety—general 2.82 (2.24) 3.10 (2.32) 0.115
 Anxiety—panic 3.95 (3.68) 4.46 (3.88) 0.077
Binge Eating Scale 8.82 (2.29) 10.14 (2.37) 0.026 0.169
SF-8 Health Survey
 Overall health 1.60 (1.13) 1.66 (1.03) 0.424
 Physical problems limit activity 0.73 (0.94) 0.71 (0.93) 0.798
 Physical health limit work 0.67 (0.97) 0.63 (0.87) 0.619
 Bodily pain 1.41 (1.10) 1.42 (1.10) 0.864
 Energy 1.53 (0.92) 1.63 (0.83) 0.091
 Physical/emotional limit social 0.89 (1.04) 0.94 (1.01) 0.510
 Bothered by emotional problems 1.25 (1.08) 1.42 (1.13) 0.015 0.185
 Emotional problems limit work 0.81 (0.99) 0.89 (1.02) 0.302
When do you seek medical help 2.86 (1.32) 3.06 (1.24) 0.027 0.168
Demographics
 Age 34.84 (13.10) 30.95 (10.92) <.001 0.297
 Median income (IQR) $26,250 ($7000–48,750) $21,250 ($11,000–55,000) 0.001 0.251
 Percent female 55.71 54.45 0.739
 Years of education 14.66 (2.08) 14.51 (2.11) 0.333
 Body mass index 26.10 (6.24) 26.56 (7.75) 0.416
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score. Higher BES scores indicate more binge-eating 
symptomology.
Utilization of treatment
The survey asked about participants’ propensity to seek 
treatment after feeling ill. Specifically, the questionnaire 
asked “When you are ill you usually seek medical assis-
tance,” and participants indicated “immediately”, “the 
next day”, 2–3 days after beginning to feel ill”, “4–7 days 
after beginning to feel ill”, “only after 1 week”, or “never”.
The SF‑8 Health Survey (4‑week recall)
The eight questions asked on the SF-8 Health Survey 
(Ware et  al. 2001) were used to gauge the participants’ 
current health situation and overall quality of life (Lefante 
et al. 2005). Specifically, participants answered a series of 
questions using 5–6 point likert-type scales. These ques-
tions included: “Overall, how would you rate your health 
during the past 4  weeks?”; “During the past 4  weeks, 
how much did physical health problems limit your usual 
physical activities?”; “During the past 4 weeks, how much 
trouble did you have doing your daily work, both at home 
and away from home, because of your physical health?”; 
“how much bodily pain have you had during the past 
4  weeks?”; “During the past 4  weeks how much energy 
did you have?”;”During the past 4 weeks, how much did 
your physical health or emotional problems limit your 
usual social activities with family or friends?”; “During 
the past 4 weeks, how much have you been bothered by 
emotional problems (such as feeling anxious, depressed, 
or irritable)?”; “During the past 4 weeks, how much did 
personal or emotional problems keep you from doing 
your usual work, school or other daily activities?”
Procedures
To participate in the study, AMT users first accessed the 
survey by logging onto the AMT service and selecting 
the “Decision Making Study” HIT. Although the Virginia 
Tech Institutional Review Board deemed the current 
study exempt from review, participants read an overview 
of the study and indicated that they agreed to participate 
in the tasks by checking a box on the screen. Compensa-
tion was provided for timely and thoughtful completion 
of the survey. Participants received $2.50 for submission 
of the survey. Additionally, users could receive a bonus of 
$2.50 for careful and complete responses to the survey 
items.
Data analysis
For the sunk-cost assessment, any pattern of responses 
wherein the participant was willing to watch the movie 
longer after having paid for it was indicative of commit-
ting the sunk-cost fallacy. The present data are presented 
as a binary measure if the participants did or did not 
commit the fallacy. In other words, a participant was 
considered to have committed the sunk-cost fallacy if 
they chose to invest more time watching TV only after 
they were told that had already paid money ($10.95) for 
the activity. This would be in comparison to the condition 
in which they were told their initial time spent watching 
TV was free. Results of the sunk-cost fallacy assessment 
were used to create groupings whereby our other meas-
ures were compared using two-tailed two-sample t tests.
Data from the BIS-18 were analyzed based on a four-
factor model (Andreu et al. 2008). This model contained 
both the somatization and depression categories typically 
used (Derogatis 2001), but broke the anxiety categories 
into two factors (i.e., Anxiety-General, Anxiety-Panic). 
Dividing anxiety into these two factors maximized the 
potential to see relations between anxiety and the sunk-
cost fallacy. Scores from each category were summed, 
and the mean score from those that committed the sunk-
cost fallacy were compared.
Data from the BES were analyzed by weighting the 
scores from each of the 16 BES questions (Gormally et al. 
1982), and totaling the weighted scores across items. 
Higher score indicated a higher probability of binge eat-
ing disorder. These total scores were then compared in 
individuals that did and did not commit the sunk-cost 
fallacy.
Each of the eight health questions was analyzed indi-
vidually. Specifically, the means for each of the SF-8 
health questions were compared in individuals whom did 
and did not commit the sunk-cost fallacy.
Results
Data from several measures for individuals that did 
(n = 834) and did not (n = 219) commit the sunk-cost fal-
lacy are summarized in Table 1. Consistent with previous 
studies (Bruine de Bruin et al. 2007; Strough et al. 2008, 
2011), individuals that committed the sunk-cost fallacy 
tended to be younger than those that did not. Addition-
ally, they reported being significantly more bothered by 
emotional problems, and reported waiting longer to seek 
medical attention when they were feeling ill, than indi-
viduals that did not commit the sunk-cost fallacy. Moreo-
ver, individuals that committed the sunk-cost fallacy had 
significantly lower incomes. Examining the data from the 
BSI-18, individuals that committed the sunk-cost fallacy 
displayed more signs of depression than those that did 
not. This relation, however, was not observed for soma-
tization, or either of the two anxiety subscales. Similarly, 
individuals that committed the sunk-cost fallacy scored 
higher on the Binge Eating Scale than those that did not.
Figure 1 provides a fine-grained analysis of the propor-
tion of individuals in various age groups that committed 
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the sunk-cost fallacy. Consistent with previous investi-
gations, considerably fewer older adults (>60  years old) 
committed the sunk-cost fallacy than young adults (i.e., 
<20 years old). The decrease in proportion of individuals 
that committed the sunk-cost fallacy, however, was mod-
est across most age brackets, with a robust decrease for 
older adults.
Discussion
The present study linked the sunk-cost fallacy to reported 
urgency to seek medical treatment and to symptoms 
of depression. The current findings are an initial step 
towards delineating any relation between the sunk fallacy 
and health-oriented behavior (cf., Coleman 2010). Fur-
ther, the current study replicates previous findings that 
older individuals commit the sunk cost less than younger 
individuals (cf., Bruine de Bruin et al. 2007; Strough et al. 
2008, 2011), and provides initial evidence for associations 
between symptoms of depression and binge eating dis-
order. There are four additional points we would like to 
make about the current findings.
First, committing the sunk-cost fallacy was associated 
with the tendency to wait longer when seeking medical 
help due to illness in comparison those who do not com-
mit the fallacy. Interestingly, individuals who committed 
the sunk-cost fallacy tended to wait longer to seek help 
when ill, and reported being more bothered by emotional 
problems, yet they reported that these emotional prob-
lems did not impact their social or occupational func-
tioning (Ware et  al. 2001). This may be because those 
who commit may be more likely to endure unpleasant 
conditions (i.e., further invest) is bolstered by their previ-
ous suffering (i.e., sunk costs). This possibility, however, 
awaits further research.
Nevertheless, with approximately 80  % of our sample 
committing the sunk-cost fallacy, the tendency of these 
individuals to suffer through illness may have wide-
reaching implications for public health. Specifically, 
with such a large proportion of the population tending 
to suffer longer through physical and psychiatric dis-
tress, traditional methods of promoting the utilization 
of health care may be hindered. For example, traditional 
approaches to alleviating health disparities by providing 
free or low cost health insurance (i.e., minimal previous 
investment; Smith 2003) may not effectively compel this 
population (i.e., those that commit the sunk cost fallacy) 
to undergo the expense and effort (i.e., further invest-
ment) involved in utilizing health care. This possibility, 
which is supported by the observation that programs 
such as Medicaid have inefficiently promoted health (see 
Richman 2005, for a discussion), suggests that behavio-
ral economic processes may need to be considered in the 
design of public health promotion programs.
The potential need to consider behavioral economic 
processes such as the sunk-cost fallacy when formulating 
approaches to health disparities may be compounded by 
the negative relation between committing the sunk-cost 
fallacy and socioeconomic status (i.e., income). Specifi-
cally, individuals that commit the sunk-cost fallacy have 
significantly lower incomes, and thus may be more sub-
ject to programs aimed at alleviating health disparities 
such as Medicaid. The precise relation between the ten-
dency to commit the sunk-cost fallacy and utilization of 
programs aimed at decreasing health disparities, how-
ever, should be further investigated.
Second, individuals that committed the sunk-cost 
fallacy scored higher on assessments of symptoms of 
depression and binge eating than individuals who did not 
commit the fallacy. Consistent with the previous point, 
individuals with BED (Fairburn and Harrison 2003), and 
with depression (Wang et al. 2005; Young et al. 2001), are 
difficult populations to compel to utilize health services. 
The present findings, in combination with the age effect 
observed here and elsewhere (Strough et al. 2008, 2011), 
add to our understanding of which populations have a 
higher likelihood of committing the sunk-cost fallacy. 
From a practical standpoint, when dealing with popula-
tions with an elevated propensity to commit this logical 
fallacy, treatment retention strategies such as requiring a 
deposit (i.e., sunk costs) at the onset of treatment (Cole-
man 2010) may be particularly effective. These possibili-
ties, however, await future research.
Third, the present study replicated previously observed 
relations, suggesting that AMT may be a reliable way to 
collect psychologically oriented data. For example, the 
negative relation between the tendency to commit the 
sunk cost fallacy and age was replicated in the present 
Fig. 1 The proportion of individuals that committed the sunk cost 
at various age ranges (i.e., 10–19, 20–29, 30–39, 40–49, 50–59, 60+; 
labeled by the lowest age in the range)
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study (Strough et  al. 2008, 2011). Moreover, Sprouse 
(2011) directly replicated one of his experiments on lin-
guistic judgments using the AMT platform, and Bickel 
et  al. (2004) recently replicated findings regarding the 
higher than average rates of delay discounting seen in 
cigarette smokers, relative to non-smoking controls, 
using AMT. Taken together, these findings suggest that 
the AMT platform produces data that are similar to 
those collected using more traditional laboratory-based 
methods.
Lastly, there are a number of issues that limit the con-
clusions of the present study. First, our sampling proce-
dure yielded an unequal number of participants that did 
and did not commit the sunk-cost fallacy. Although this 
process clarified the proportion of a large sample that 
committed the sunk-cost fallacy, equal sample sizes in 
each group would have been ideal. Second, the order of 
the two sunk-cost questions was fixed (i.e., not counter-
balanced). Although this could have impacted the pre-
sent findings, previous investigations presenting these 
questions in counterbalanced order (Strough et al. 2008, 
2011) did not report significant order effects. Third, the 
present study consisted of self-report data taken from a 
cross-sectional sample. Future research employing exper-
imental analogs of the sunk cost fallacy and/or independ-
ent verification of psychological symptomology may 
strengthen the conclusions that can be made. Fourth, it 
is possible participants may have not attended to one or 
both of the vignettes used to evaluate the sunk-cost fal-
lacy in the present study. The sunk cost effects observed, 
however, were systematic and in line with hypothesized 
relations with mental health symptoms (e.g., depres-
sion), symptoms of binge eating, and those with delayed 
treatment seeking, making such a confound less likely to 
have influenced the data. Finally, unlike previous studies, 
the current study only asked about sunk costs involving 
money rather than both money and time. Although ask-
ing about both types of investment may have improved 
our ability to observe effects, previous research has found 
that investments of money more reliably elicit the sunk 
cost fallacy than those of time (Coleman 2010).
Conclusions
The present findings advance our understanding of the 
relation between the sunk-cost fallacy and health behav-
ior. The current findings, however, await their applica-
tion to the improvement of health behavior through their 
incorporation into individualized treatment (e.g., depos-
its for health services; Coleman 2010), and consideration 
when making decisions about decreasing health dispari-
ties (e.g., Medicaid; Richman 2005). These applications 
will test the utility of understanding the impact of sunk 
costs.
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